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a b s t r a c t 
Remanufacturing is an opportunity to deliver all-round sustainability beneﬁts when products are de- 
signed accordingly. In this paper, we focus on the link between remanufacturing and the opportunity to 
lower the variable remanufacturing cost via process innovation. Speciﬁcally, we analyse how the opportu- 
nity is utilized in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Only the manufacturer may 
undertake process innovation, while remanufacturing as such could be done by either the manufacturer 
or the retailer. We ﬁnd that although the traditional manufacturing process accepts incremental improve- 
ment, remanufacturing in general requires stepwise innovation; thus, the optimal strategy of managing 
process innovation in a forward supply chain does not directly apply to manage process innovation for 
remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain. Our analytical results also show that a decentralised sup- 
ply chain could be more likely to take up remanufacturing than an integrated supply chain, especially 
when the process innovation cost is suﬃciently high. Consequently, ineﬃciency resulting from decentral- 
isation of decision-making in the closed-loop supply chain may cause not only underinvestment but also 
overinvestment in process innovation for remanufacturing. Finally, through an extensive numerical anal- 
ysis, we ﬁnd that this overinvestment always reduces the environmental impact in terms of the overall 
production quantity, even if the decision-making process does not explicitly consider any environmental 
aspect. 
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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2  1. Introduction 
Remanufacturing presents a golden opportunity to deliver a
sustainable future. It reduces the disposal of end-of-use products
and consumes less natural resources and energy than manufac-
turing all-new products ( Agrawal, Ferguson, & Souza, 2016; Atasu,
Guide, & Van Wassenhove, 2008; Giuntini & Gaudette, 2003 ). How-
ever, the full social, environmental and economic beneﬁts of re-
manufacturing cannot be realised unless design for remanufactur-
ing becomes an integral part of the product development process
( Seitz & Peattie, 2004 ). It is also widely agreed that economic con-
siderations must be at the forefront of design for remanufacturing
because there is little sense in improving remanufacturability if it
will render the product not cost effective ( Linton, 2008 ). 
Some manufacturers who are very good at manufacturing can-
not operate the remanufacturing business in a proﬁtable manner;∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: zhouyu@cqu.edu.cn (Y. Zhou). 
l  
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m  
l  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.01.028 
0377-2217/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article.g., Ford purchased several automotive salvage yards and parts re-
ycling companies to levy the potential economic beneﬁt associ-
ted with end-of-use vehicle processing. But, because of its inexpe-
ience in the specialised sector, Ford had to abandon the business
nd redirect resources to auto making ( Karakayali, l. Emir-Farinas,
 Akcali, 2007 ). 
The pioneers who greatly succeed in the remanufacturing sector
sually make huge investments in new product design to lower the
emanufacturing cost ( Genc & De Giovanni, 2018; Zhu et al., 2014 ).
uji Xerox shows that the cost saving from photocopier remanufac-
uring is signiﬁcantly increased because of one intentioned design
or disassembly ( Kerr & Ryan, 2001 ); Bosch has developed an inex-
ensive chip for its power tools and household appliances to facil-
tate the assessment of the quality of components harvested from
ollected used products ( Robotis, Boyaci, & Verter, 2012; Toffel,
004 ). In fact, many other design concepts are appropriate to
ower the remanufacturing cost, see Hatcher, Ijomah, and Windmill
2011) for a review. These approaches have various aspects in com-
on: they require a substantial upfront R&D investment; they can
ower the unit production cost of remanufactured products, but dounder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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n  ot necessarily change the unit production cost of new products
igniﬁcantly; and to what extent the remanufacturing cost can be
owered depends on the R&D level. In this paper, we refer to these
pproaches as Process Innovation for Remanufacturing (PIR) . 
Our primary objective in this paper is to develop a general un-
erstanding of the operational strategy to manage PIR in a closed-
oop supply chain; we are particularly interested in the following
uestion: 
• Why do some manufacturers make huge investments in PIR, while
many others invest zero? 
To investigate this issue, we at ﬁrst consider an integrated sup-
ly chain model to derive the global optimal solution for PIR. In-
erestingly, we ﬁnd that the optimal PIR strategy is usually an all-
r-nothing strategy; in other words, the supply chain should invest
ggressively to realise the maximum unit cost saving from reman-
facturing, or totally give up remanufacturing. The driving force
ehind this result lies in that the optimal production quantity of
emanufactured products is zero unless the cost saving from re-
anufacturing is high enough. If the investment on PIR cannot
uarantee a minimum cost reduction necessary to take up reman-
facturing at all, then it is optimal for the supply chain to produce
ew products only. Contrary to that, it is worth noting that with
pportunities to lower the variable manufacturing cost, the supply
hain does not require a threshold to trigger the new product pro-
uction, and then a small incremental improvement is acceptable,
.e., the supply chain always invests in process innovation for man-
facturing. Therefore, we obtain an important implication: tradi-
ional innovation strategies in the literature may not be applicable
o manage PIR in the closed-loop supply chain. 
Closed-loop supply chains routinely involve more decision-
akers than forward supply chains ( Guide & Van Wassenhove,
009 ). When the beneﬁts of innovation are shared by others in
he supply chain, the innovator has no incentive to invest at
he global optimal level. The underinvestment problem has been
ell documented in the literature as the consequence of decen-
ralised decision-making in the forward supply chain ( Amaldoss &
apoport, 2005; Ge, Hu, & Xia, 2014; Terwiesch & Xu, 2008 ). Yet,
s we have mentioned above, the closed-loop supply chain con-
ext for PIR decisions is very different. Thus, we are interested in
nswering the following question: 
• What are the consequences of decentralised decision-making on
the manufacturer’s PIR strategy? 
In many cases, it is the manufacturer who physically engages
n remanufacturing and one of our model variants will capture
hat situation; e.g., as a world class manufacturer of heavy ma-
hinery, Caterpillar runs several remanufacturing programs by it-
elf ( Zhou, Xiong, Li, Xiong, & Beck, 2013 ). However, some man-
facturers are incapable to remanufacture in a proﬁtable manner,
r they are reluctant to remanufacture because of concerns about
annibalisation of the new product sales; consequently, the reman-
facturing opportunity is captured by someone else. Thus, we con-
ider a second model variant in which the downstream player, i.e.,
he retailer, may operate the remanufacturing business. Retailer-
emanufacturing is not uncommon in practice, especially in the
ndustry of heavy machinery. Not all western manufacturers are
apable to establish remanufacturing factories in China, like what
aterpillar did. Consequently, some local retailers such as SEVALO
onstruction Machinery Group have collected the used products
nd operated the remanufacturing business, see Yi, Huang, Guo,
nd Shi (2016) for details. 
In a closed-loop supply chain with manufacturer-
emanufacturing, we conﬁrm the existence of the underinvest-
ent issue. As for a closed-loop supply chain with retailer-
emanufacturing, conventional wisdom might suggest theanufacturer invests nothing in PIR because of the cannibali-
ation concern. But, our analysis demonstrates an overinvestment
roblem resulting from decentralisation of decision-making: the
anufacturer invests over the global optimal level in PIR under
ertain conditions. The economic intuition behind this ﬁnding
s interpreted as follows. In a decentralised setting, even if the
anufacturer invests nothing in PIR, the retailer may engage in
emanufacturing; and then the manufacturer could be better off
y investing in PIR to induce the retailer to remanufacture as
any units as possible (note that, the remanufactured product
uantity is bound by the new product quantity) and charging the
etailer a higher new product wholesale price. 
Note that in practice we also observe a lot of cases in which
emanufacturing is operated by a third-party remanufacturer, but
hese cases are uninteresting from a PIR perspective. Competing
ith an independent remanufacturer, as demonstrated by the liter-
ture, e.g., Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Majumder and Groenevelt
2001) , and Örsdemir, Kemahlıo ˘glu-Ziya, and Parlaktürk (2014) , the
anufacturer has no incentive to lower the remanufacturing cost,
nd hence invests zero for PIR. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The
ext section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 presents
he model. Section 4 characterises the optimal PIR strategies.
ection 5 conducts a comparison between model variants to high-
ight the economic and environmental consequences of decen-
ralised decision-making. Section 6 concludes the paper. All math-
matical proofs are provided in the online Appendix A. 
. Relevant literature 
This study builds on and contributes to two research streams:
1) the literature on closed-loop supply chain management, and (2)
he literature on innovation and new product development man-
gement. The ﬁrst stream typically ignores the possibility of PIR
o lower the variable remanufacturing cost by defaulting the cost
o be exogenous, and the second stream mainly focuses on innova-
ion relating to demand enhancement or cost reduction of the new
roduct. To the best of our knowledge, this paper makes the ﬁrst
ttempt to bridge these two streams and investigates the optimal
IR strategy in a decentralised closed-loop supply chain. In what
ollows, we provide an overview of the relevant literature and clar-
fy our contributions. 
Managing closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing has
een an active area of research in recent years; we refer the reader
o Govindan, Soleimani, and Kannan (2015), Souza (2013) , and
iallo, Venkatadri, Khatab, and Bhakthavatchalam (2017) for a thor-
ugh discussion. This research stream usually assumes that reman-
facturing is a low-cost alternative of all-new manufacturing, and
ses the cost saving from remanufacturing to characterize the op-
imal remanufacturing strategy; see, e.g., De Giovanni and Zaccour
2014), Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006) , and Han, Wu, Yang, and
hang (2017) . However, the variable remanufacturing cost in these
xisting studies is assumed to be exogenous. Our contribution to
his stream is straightforward; that is, our model takes PIR into
onsideration by allowing the manufacturer to invest in process in-
ovation to lower the variable remanufacturing cost. Our analysis
haracterizes the relationship between the optimal PIR level and
he optimal remanufacturing strategy. For the closed-loop supply
hain, if the optimal PIR level is zero, then the optimal strategy
s not to remanufacture; otherwise, the optimal strategy is to re-
anufacture as many units as possible. This result differs from the
tandard structure under the exogenous remanufacturing cost as-
umption, where as a third option, partial remanufacturing might
e optimal. 
A growing amount of studies pay attention to innovation and
ew product development in a forward supply chain; see, e.g.,
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e  Arya, Löﬄer, Mittendorf, and Pfeiffer (2015), Kim and Netessine
(2013) , and Du, Xu, Chen, and Tsai (2016) . As these papers do
not consider remanufacturing, it is unclear whether the optimal
innovation strategies derived in these papers can be apply to
the closed-loop setting. Thus, we expand this research stream to
closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing. More importantly,
our work makes a substantial contribution by demonstrating that
the optimal strategy of managing process innovation for manufac-
turing in forward supply chains does no directly apply in that the
remanufacturing context is fundamentally different; speciﬁcally,
the traditional manufacturing process accepts small incremental
improvements, but remanufacturing in general requires stepwise
innovation that can signiﬁcantly lower the variable remanufactur-
ing cost. 
A few papers consider the decisions on remanufacturing and in-
novation together. Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassenhove (2005) is, to
the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to analyse product technology
selection in the remanufacturing context. Their model characterises
whether to produce a remanufacturable product. Özdemir, Denizel,
and Guide (2012) examine the manufacturer’s remanufacturing de-
cisions in a legislative disposal fee environment. Wu (2012) consid-
ers the competition between a manufacturer and a remanufacturer
and investigates the manufacturer’s strategic dilemma when de-
termining the degree of disassemblability. Similarly, Subramanian,
Ferguson, and Toktay (2013) extend the classic component com-
monality decision to consider remanufacturing operated by either
the manufacturer or the remanufacturer. The investment in com-
ponent commonality can be viewed as an investment in lowering
the remanufacturing cost. Their analysis identiﬁes the conditions in
which the commonality decision may be reversed due to reman-
ufacturing. Atasu and Souza (2013) and Li, Reimann, and Zhang
(2018) study the impact of remanufacturing on product design,
speciﬁcally new product quality. They ﬁnd that remanufacturing
induces the monopolist to provider higher quality new products. 
These most relevant papers investigate PIR in a monopoly set-
ting or under a competition between the manufacturer and third-
party remanufacturers. Our work contributes to that literature by
putting the PIR issue into a real supply chain context and revealing
the consequences of decentralised decision-making on the manu-
facturer’s PIR strategy. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the manufacturer
might invest over the global optimal level in PIR in the decen-
tralised closed-loop supply chain with retailer-remanufacturing. 
3. The model 
In this study, we consider a closed-loop supply chain consisting
of two ﬁrms: a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer who
produces new products has opportunities to lower the variable cost
of remanufacturing via process innovation, such as design for dis-
assembly. The retailer orders new products from the manufacturer
and sells them to ﬁnal customers. Remanufacturing of end-of-use
products is performed by either the manufacturer or the retailer,
but not both, one explanation for which could be the high ﬁxed
cost of setting up the collection and remanufacturing operations. 
To avoid the distraction of initial and terminal time-period ef-
fect, following the literature on remanufacturing, e.g., Ovchinnikov
(2011), Subramanian et al. (2013) , and Wu and Zhou (2016) , we fo-
cus our analysis on a steady state, which implies that players use
the identical strategies in every period after a ramp-up in the ﬁrst
period. 
3.1. Model variants and notation 
We consider three different variants within the closed-loop
supply chain, see Fig. 1 for illustration. As a benchmark case, an integrated supply chain model (Model
) is ﬁrst analysed, where all decisions are centrally coordinated.
his will provide us with the supply chain optimal decisions. 
Next, our focus will be on the managerial implications of de-
entralised decision-making; particularly, we would like to exam-
ne the structural inﬂuence of who (the manufacturer or the re-
ailer) undertakes the remanufacturing task on the optimal PIR
evel. Thus, in the second variant, we consider a decentralised
upply chain model with the manufacturer remanufacturing used
roducts (Model DM). The timeline of decision-making is as fol-
ows: the manufacturer moves ﬁrst by deciding on the optimal
rocess innovation level and the wholesale prices of the new and
emanufactured products; and then the retailer decides the quan-
ities. 
In the third variant, we consider a decentralised supply chain
ith the retailer remanufacturing used products (Model DR). The
imeline of decision-making is as follows: the manufacturer ﬁrstly
ecides the optimal innovation level and the wholesale price of the
ew product, and then the retailer decides the quantities of the
ew and remanufactured products. 
In the following analysis, subscript i ∈ { I, M, R } refers to the in-
egrated supply chain, the manufacturer, and the retailer, respec-
ively; superscript j ∈ { I, DM, DR } denotes the integrated supply
hain model, as well as the decentralised supply chain models with
he manufacturer remanufacturing and the retailer remanufactur-
ng, respectively. Table 1 summarises the notations. 
.2. Cost structure and supply of remanufacturable cores 
The literature on remanufacturing typically assumes that re-
anufacturing of one used product does not cost more than man-
facturing of one new product, e.g., Ovchinnikov, Blass, and Raz
2014), Savaskan, Bhattacharya, and Van Wassenhove (2004) , and
ong, Govindan, Xu, and Du (2017) . We follow this assumption; in
ddition, we consider the manufacturer’s opportunities to reduce
he variable remanufacturing cost, and hence in this study 
 r = c n − rθ, (1)
here 0 ≤ r ≤ c n , 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 . The parameter r measures the max-
mum amount of cost reduction that can be attained via process
nnovation. It is restricted by the current level of science and tech-
ology, i.e., the variable remanufacturing cost cannot be less than
 n − r regardless of how much the manufacturer invests. Eq. (1) im-
lies that remanufacturing has no cost advantage in the absence of
nvestments on process innovation, i.e., c r = c n when θ = 0 . Note
hat this assumption is not critical and relaxing it, i.e., c r is lower
han c n , does not qualitatively change our main results. 
The manufacturer’s upfront investment is a function of the pro-
ess innovation level and modelled as k θ2 . The investment is con-
ex with respect to θ , which is often attributed to diminishing re-
urns from R&D expenditures ( Gilbert & Cvsa, 2003; Pun, 2014; Wu
 Zhou, 2017 ). 
Without loss of generality, the retailer’s variable selling cost is
ssumed to be constant and normalized to 0 . 
Remanufacturing is possible only if new products have been
sed and become cores for remanufacturing. We assume that
he product can be remanufactured at most once ( Ferrer &
waminathan, 2010; Jin, Nie, Yang, & Zhou, 2017; Li, Li, & Cai,
012 ). Thus, the remanufactured product quantity in the current
eriod is constrained by the new product quantity in the previous
eriod, which is equal to the new product quantity in the current
eriod; i.e., we have the constraint q r ≤ q n in a steady-state period.
We recognise that in practice not all used products can be col-
ected and remanufactured (i.e., in practice q r ≤ φq n with φ < 1 ).
et, in assuming φ = 1 we again follow the literature, e.g., Agrawal
t al. (2016), Zhou et al. (2013) , and Saha, Sarmah, and Moon
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Manufacturer
Retailer
Consumers
Model I
The flow of 
new products
Manufacturer
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Model DM
The flow of 
remanufactured
products
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Retailer
Consumers
Model DR
The flow of 
used products
Fig. 1. Three variants within the closed-loop supply chain. 
Table 1 
Notations. 
Symbol Deﬁnition 
Parameters 
c n ∈ ( 0 , 1 ) Variable cost of the new product 
c r ∈ ( 0 , c n ] Variable cost of the remanufactured product 
r ∈ ( 0 , c n ) Maximal unit cost saving from remanufacturing via process innovation 
k ∈ ( 0 , + ∞ ) Investment cost parameter of process innovation in a steady-state period 
δ ∈ ( 0 , 1 ] Consumer value discount for the remanufactured product 
Decision and auxiliary variables 
θ ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] Level of process innovation 
p n / p r ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] Market clearing price of the new/remanufactured product 
w n / w r ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] Wholesale price of the new/remanufactured product 
q n / q r ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] Quantity of the new/remanufactured product 
 j 
i 
∈ [ 0 , + ∞ ) Player i ’s proﬁt, i ∈ { I, M, R } , j ∈ { I, DM, DR } 
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m2016) . This assumption signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the analysis and
oes not change any of the qualitative insights. 
.3. Inverse demand functions 
Remanufacturing cannibalises sales of the new product. How-
ver, empirical evidence and experimental results show that con-
umers usually value the remanufactured product less than the
ew one ( Agrawal, Atasu, & v. Ittersum, 2015; Guide & Li, 2010;
u & Zhou, 2016 ). In this paper, we follow the extant litera-
ure, e.g. Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Örsdemir et al. (2014) , and
ang, Cai, Tsay, and Vakharia (2017) , and assume that consumers’
illingness-to-pay for the new product is heterogeneous and uni-
ormly distributed in the interval [ 0 , 1 ] with the density of 1, and
ach consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured prod-
ct is a fraction δ of that for the new one. Each consumer buys at
ost one unit of the new/remanufactured product. Furthermore,
oth new and remanufactured products can be used for one pe-
iod (that is, one period is deﬁned as the product life duration).
ence in every period all consumers have to make their purchase
ecisions, thereby keeping the total market size constant. 
The consumer heterogeneity assumption, together with the uni-
orm distribution, give rise to the linear inverse demand functions
hich facilitate analytical tractability of the model. As mentioned
bove, the consumer’s purchasing decision assumption controls the
arket size and thereby also reﬂects the steady-state nature of our
odel. Summarizing, our model builds on previous literature by using
he following inverse demand functions 
p n = 1 − q n − δq r , (2) 
p r = δ( 1 − q n − q r ) . (3) 
.4. Optimization models for decision making 
As mentioned above, in Model I all decisions are centrally co-
rdinated, yielding the supply chain optimal decisions. The associ-
ted optimisation problem is 
max 
, q n , q r 
I I = ( p n − c n ) q n + ( p r − ( c n − rθ ) ) q r − k θ2 , (4) 
ubject to 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 , q n ≥ q r ≥ 0 . 
Conversely, in Model DM, where the manufacturer remanufac-
ures the used products the manufacturer’s optimisation problem
s 
max 
, w n , w r 
DM M = ( w n − c n ) q n + ( w r − ( c n − rθ ) ) q r − k θ2 , 
subject to 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 . (5) 
The retailer’s optimisation problem is 
ax 
q n , q r 
DM R = ( p n − w n ) q n + ( p r − w r ) q r , subject to q n ≥ q r ≥ 0 . 
(6) 
Finally, in Model DR the manufacturer’s optimisation problem
s 
ax 
θ, w n 
DR M = ( w n − c n ) q n − k θ2 , subject to 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 . (7) 
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 The retailer’s optimisation problem is 
max 
q n , q r 
DR R = ( p n − w n ) q n + ( p r − ( c n − rθ ) ) q r , subject to q n ≥ q r ≥ 0 . (8)
4. The analysis 
Our analysis is based on the solutions of these models through
backward induction. Thus, we ﬁrst obtain the optimal quantities q n 
and q r as a function of θ and the wholesale price(s). Then, we de-
rive the optimal PIR level as well as the optimal wholesale price(s).
To start out, let us ﬁrst consider the effect of PIR on the optimal
quantity responses. The following lemma highlights a very general
result for Models I and DM. 
Lemma 1. In the integrated supply chain or the decentralised sup-
ply chain with manufacturer-remanufacturing, the optimal PIR strat-
egy and the optimal quantity responses are linked in the following
way: 
1) If it is optimal not to carry out PIR, i.e. , θ ∗ = 0 , then it is optimal
not to remanufacture, i.e. , q r 
∗ = 0 ; 
2) If it is optimal to carry out PIR, i.e. , θ ∗ > 0 , then it is optimal to
remanufacture as many units as possible, i.e. , q r 
∗ = q n . 
This all-or-nothing result differs from the standard structure
under exogenous remanufacturing costs, where as a third option,
partial remanufacturing is possible. The economic intuition behind
our differing result lies in the fact that in our model the variable
remanufacturing cost is endogenous. Without investment, i.e., θ =
0 , there is no cost saving from remanufacturing, and given con-
sumers’ reduced willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured prod-
uct, intuitively, there should be no remanufacturing in the inte-
grated model. 1 
In the decentralised supply chain model with manufacturer-
remanufacturing, the intuition is similar. Any positive investment
in process innovation θ > 0 yields a cost saving from remanu-
facturing. Now assume that the manufacturer chooses wholesale
prices for the new and remanufactured products that induce the
retailer not to order all available remanufactured products. Be-
cause cost savings will not be fully realised when not all used
products are remanufactured, we can say that a portion of invest-
ment is wasted. Consequently, the manufacturer could improve its
economic performance by cutting down on the investment. This
in turn reduces cost savings from remanufacturing, leading to a
smaller optimal order quantity of the remanufactured product and
more unrealised cost savings. Therefore, a strategy with non-zero
investment in which not all used products are remanufactured is
always a suboptimal strategy compared to the strategy without in-
vestment. 
We can now turn to our main results concerning the optimal
process innovation level. Propositions 1 and 2 provide the struc-
tural insights into PIR for models I, DM, and DR, respectively. 
Proposition 1 . The optimal PIR strategy in an integrated sup-
ply chain or a decentralised supply chain with manufacturer-
remanufacturing is given by one of two possible structures ( X = 4 for
Model I and X = 8 for Model DM): 
1) If δ > 1+ 
√ 
17 
8 ( ≈0 . 64 ) , 
1 −
√ 
1 − 4 δ( 1 −δ) 
3 δ−1 
2 < c n < 
1+ 
√ 
1 − 4 δ( 1 −δ) 
3 δ−1 
2 , and r >
( 1 −δ)( δ+2 c n −3 c n 2 ) 
1+ δ−2 c n , the optimal PIR strategy follows a tri-fold struc-
ture: (i) θ I∗ = 0 , if k ≥ r 2 ( 1 −c n ) 2 
X( 1 −δ)( δ+2 c n −3 c n 2 ) ; (ii) θ
I∗ = r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
Xk ( 1+3 δ) −r 2 , if
r 2 + r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
X( 1+3 δ) ≤ k < 
r 2 ( 1 −c n ) 2 
X( 1 −δ)( δ+2 c n −3 c n 2 ) ; (iii) θ
I∗ = 1 , otherwise. 1 For our setting with c r = c n , it is clear that zero investment cannot lead to re- 
manufacturing in the integrated model since there are no cost beneﬁts and reman- 
ufactured products can only be sold at a lower price. We note however that our 
result holds even for c r < c n , unless c r is too low. When c r gets too low, the asso- 
ciated initial cost advantage of remanufacturing over new production gives rise to 
remanufacturing even there is no (additional) process investment, i.e. θ = 0 . 
 
 
 
 2) Otherwise, the optimal PIR strategy is an all-or-nothing strategy:
(i) θ I∗ = 0 , if k ≥ ( 1+ δ−2 c n + r ) 2 
X( 1+3 δ) −
( 1 −c n ) 2 
X ; (ii) θ
I∗ = 1 , otherwise. 
It is demonstrated that in the integrated supply chain, the op-
imal PIR level is decreasing in the investment cost parameter k ;
peciﬁcally, if k is suﬃciently high, the optimal strategy is to invest
othing. Although this result seems to be in line with intuition, it
igniﬁcantly differs from the optimal strategy of managing process
nnovation for manufacturing in a traditional supply chain. 
As shown in Appendix B, with opportunities to lower the vari-
ble manufacturing cost, the traditional supply chain always in-
ests in process innovation regardless of the value of the invest-
ent cost parameter; i.e., the optimal process innovation level
ight be suﬃciently low, but it is always greater than 0 . In this
ase, we say the traditional manufacturing process accepts incre-
ental improvement. 
In contrast, a small incremental improvement in the remanufac-
uring cost eﬃciency is valueless to the closed-loop supply chain;
.e., the optimal PIR level is either suﬃciently high or 0 . In this
ase, we say the remanufacturing process requires stepwise inno-
ation that can signiﬁcantly lower the variable remanufacturing
ost. This is because, unlike in the case of process innovation for
anufacturing, there is a minimum remanufacturing cost reduc-
ion necessary to induce the closed-loop supply chain to take up
emanufacturing at all; if the variable cost reduction is below a
hreshold, the closed-loop supply chain will never remanufacture,
nd then any investment would be wasted. Consequently, the inte-
rated supply chain does not invest in PIR, and produces the new
roduct only. 
Observe that the strategy for Model DM is structurally identical
o the strategy for Model I. The intuition behind the strategy is also
imilar. 
Proposition 2 . The optimal PIR strategy in a decentralised sup-
ly chain with retailer-remanufacturing depends on the relationship
etween c n and δ in the following way: 
1) When c n < δ/ 2 , the optimal PIR strategy is given by one of three
possible structures: 
(1.1) if ( 1 − δ)( 1 + 3 δ) − ( 1 + δ − 2 c n ) 2 ≤ 0 , it is never optimal for
the manufacturer not to invest and the PIR strategy follows a
two-fold structure: (i) θDR ∗ = r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8 k ( 1+3 δ) −r 2 , if k ≥
r 2 + r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8( 1+3 δ) ;
(ii) θDR ∗ = 1 , otherwise; 
(1.2) otherwise, and if r > ( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −( δ+2 c n −3 c n 
2 ) 
1+ δ−2 c n , the optimal
PIR strategy follows a tri-fold structure: (i) θDR ∗ = 0 ,
if k ≥ r 2 ( 1 −δ) 
8( ( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −( δ+2 c n −3 c n 2 ) ) ; (ii) θ
DR ∗ = r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8 k ( 1+3 δ) −r 2 , if
r 2 + r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8( 1+3 δ) ≤ k < 
r 2 ( 1 −δ) 
8( ( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −( δ+2 c n −3 c n 2 ) ) ; (iii) θ
DR ∗ = 1 ,
otherwise; 
(1.3) otherwise, the optimal PIR strategy is an all-or-nothing strat-
egy: (i) θDR ∗ = 0 , if k ≥ ( 1+ δ−2 c n + r ) 2 
8( 1+3 δ) − 1 −δ8 ; (ii) θDR ∗ = 1 , oth-
erwise. 
2) When δ/ 2 ≤ c n < δ/ ( 2 − δ) , the optimal PIR strategy is struc-
turally identical to above: 
(2.1) if 4( δ − c n )( 1 − δ)( 1 + 3 δ) − δ2 ( 1 + δ − 2 c n ) 2 ≤ 0 , it is never
optimal for the manufacturer not to invest and the PIR strat-
egy follows a two-fold structure: (i) θDR ∗ = r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8 k ( 1+3 δ) −r 2 , if k ≥
r 2 + r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8( 1+3 δ) ; (ii) θ
DR ∗ = 1 , otherwise; 
(2.2) otherwise, and if r > ( 1+ δ−2 c n )( 4( δ−c n )( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −δ
2 ( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 2 ) 
δ2 ( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 2 −4( 1 −c n )( δ−c n )( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) 
,
the optimal PIR strategy follows a tri-fold structure:
(i) θDR ∗ = 0 , if k ≥ r 2 c n ( 1 −δ)( δ−c n ) 
2( 4( δ−c n )( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −δ2 ( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 2 ) 
;
(ii) θDR ∗ = r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8 k ( 1+3 δ) −r 2 , if 
r 2 + r( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 
8( 1+3 δ) ≤ k <
r 2 c n ( 1 −δ)( δ−c n ) 
2( 4( δ−c n )( 1 −δ)( 1+3 δ) −δ2 ( 1+ δ−2 c n ) 2 ) 
; (iii) θDR ∗ = 1 , otherwise; 
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Table 2 
The scale of over- and underinvestment issues. 
Model I Model DM Model DR 
θ ∗ = 0 3367 3815 3592 
0 < θ ∗ < 1 99 110 318 
θ ∗ = 1 989 530 545 
θDM∗/DR ∗ < θ I∗ N/A 558 561 
θDM∗/DR ∗ > θ I∗ N/A 0 218 
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4(2.3) otherwise, the optimal PIR strategy is an all-or-nothing
strategy: (i) θDR ∗ = 0 , if k ≥ ( 1+ δ−2 c n + r ) 2 
8( 1+3 δ) −
c n ( 1 −δ)( δ−c n ) 
2 δ2 
; (ii)
θDR ∗ = 1 , otherwise. 
3) When c n ≥ δ/ ( 2 − δ) , the optimal PIR strategy in Model DR is
identical to the strategy in Model DM. 
Note that in Model DR the strategy is structurally very different
rom the strategies in Models I and DM, when c n < δ/ ( 2 − δ) . First,
hen c n < δ/ 2 the retailer will remanufacture even if the manu-
acturer does not invest in PIR. Second, when δ is high (precisely,
hen δ ≥ 2 / 3 and c n < δ/ 2 ) the manufacturer will always invest
n PIR regardless of the values of the investment cost parameter k
nd the magnitude of the possible reduction r, see the case (A) of
roposition 2 (1). 
The intuition behind this result hinges on the interrelation of
he demand-side and the supply-side link between the new and
emanufactured products. Speciﬁcally, the wholesale price of the
ew product will be always higher than their variable manufac-
uring cost, while the variable remanufacturing cost is less than or
qual to the variable manufacturing cost. Thus, the retailer has an
ncentive to offer the remanufactured product even when θ = 0 . In
ddition, to generate more used products available for remanufac-
uring, the retailer then also has an incentive to order more new
roducts. When c n is small relative to δ, the price-sensitivity of de-
and for the new product – driven by the (low) cannibalisation ef-
ect between the new and remanufactured products – is small, and
he manufacturer will strategically price the new product higher to
hare the remanufacturing beneﬁt. 
On the other hand, the manufacturer will not invest in PIR and
t the same time set a wholesale price for the new product that
nduces the retailer not to remanufacture. Thus, anticipating that
he retailer may remanufacture anyways, it may be even better for
he manufacturer to attempt to obtain a larger share of the reman-
facturing beneﬁt. By investing in remanufacturing cost reduction,
he manufacturer can try to induce the retailer to remanufacture
ll available used products. When demand for the remanufactured
roduct is high, the supply constraint on the availability of used
roducts reduces the pressure on the wholesale price for the new
roduct. Consequently, the increased wholesale price of the new
roduct more than covers the investment in PIR. 
. Comparison and discussion 
In this section, we ﬁrstly compare the optimal PIR levels in the
ntegrated supply chain model and the decentralised supply chain
odel to highlight ineﬃciencies resulting from the decentralisa-
ion of decision-making. Next, we are also interested in how the
ptimal PIR level and the proﬁts are shaped by key modelling pa-
ameters. Finally, we discuss the environmental implications of PIR.
ote that, due to the complexity in mathematics, some results can-
ot be ascertained analytically, but could only be veriﬁed numeri-
ally. 
.1. Comparison of optimal PIR levels 
The underinvestment issue as ineﬃciency resulting from the
ecentralisation of decision-making has been widely studied in the
iterature on traditional supply chain models, see, e.g., Bhaskaran
nd Krishnan (2009), Huang, Shen, and Xu (2016) , and Pun and
hamat (2016) . In line with intuition, in the decentralised sup-
ly chain with manufacturer-remanufacturing, the beneﬁt of the
anufacturer’s investment in PIR will be partly shared by the re-
ailer through the wholesale prices of the new and remanufactured
roducts. Such a free-riding problem leads the manufacturer to un-
erinvest, relative to the ﬁrst-best solution. Interestingly, for the decentralised supply chain with retailer-
emanufacturing, both over- and underinvestment may occur, de-
ending on the speciﬁc parameter constellation. Due to the vari-
us possible cases, it is diﬃcult to provide a closed-form solution
escribing all possible outcomes. The following proposition charac-
erises the general insights into the overinvestment issue. 
Proposition 3. Compared with the ﬁrst-best PIR level in the in-
egrated supply chain, 
1) in the decentralised supply chain with manufacturer-
remanufacturing there is never overinvestment, and the man-
ufacturer underinvests in PIR under certain conditions (detailed in
the proof); 
2) in the decentralised supply chain with retailer-remanufacturing
the manufacturer may overinvest, speciﬁcally, (i) overinvest-
ment can only occur when θ I∗ = 0 , (ii) when ( 1 − δ)( 1 + 3 δ) −
( 1 + δ − 2 c n ) 2 ≤ 0 and r ≤ ( 1 − c n ) 
√ 
1 + 3 δ − ( 1 + δ − 2 c n ) ,
overinvestment always occurs regardless of the value of k . 
This result is intriguing because it implies that the manufac-
urer would incentivise the retailer to remanufacture, when the
rst-best strategy in an integrated supply chain is not to do so.
oreover, it basically highlights that the manufacturer may be
ble to share any cost of PIR with the retailer through the whole-
ale price of the new product. The manufacturer anticipates that
he retailer, to maximise its own proﬁt, remanufactures even if
he manufacturer makes no investment; additionally, the supply
f the remanufactured products is constrained by the availability
f used products resulting from earlier new product sales. Based
n these two observations, the manufacturer capitalises on the re-
ulting reduced price-sensitivity of demand for the new product
nd amortises the investment through an increase in the whole-
ale price. Therefore, ineﬃciency resulting from the decentralisa-
ion of decision-making may lie in the manufacturer’s incentive
o overinvest in PIR in the closed-loop supply chain with retailer-
emanufacturing. 
We also perform a numerical analysis to show the scale of over-
nd underinvestment issues. The parameter values we have chosen
over a broad range of possible outcomes. The domain of parame-
ers c n , r, and δ is [ 0 , 1 ] . We consider values { 0 . 1 , 0 . 2 , . . . , 0 . 8 , 0 . 9 } ,
ubject to r ≤ c n . Finally, the domain of value k is [ 0 , ∞ ) . Af-
er some initial sensitivity tests, we chose to vary k between
 0 . 0 01 , 0 . 0 06 , . . . , 0 . 046 , 0 . 051 } to ensure that not only trivial ex-
reme scenarios (in which θ = 0 or θ = 1 ) exist. Overall, these pa-
ameter settings give rise to 4455 scenarios. 
Table 2 reveals that on an aggregate level the underinvestment
ssue is much more pronounced than the overinvestment issue in
oth decentralised models. Underinvestment occurs in around 13%
f the scenarios, while overinvestment occurs in around 5% of the
ases in Model DR. Moreover, in the underinvestment scenarios the
verage investment is θ I∗ = 0 . 95 in Model I, while in both decen-
ralised models we observe θDM∗/DR ∗ = 0 . 11 . On the other hand, in
he overinvestment scenarios the average investment by the manu-
acturer is θDR ∗ = 0 . 32 in Model DR, while, as shown in Proposition
, then there is no investment in Model I. 
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Fig. 2. Sensitivity of θ ∗ w.r.t. δ ( c n = 0 . 3 , r = 0 . 3 , k = 0 . 036 ). 
Table 3 
The results of sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity of I / M / R w.r.t. 
Model I Model DM Model DR 
c n −/na/na ±/ −/ ± ±/ −/ ±
r + /na/na ±/ ±/ ± ±/ ±/ ±
δ + /na/na ±/ ±/ ± ±/ ±/ ±
k −/na/na ±/ ±/ ± ±/ ±/ ±
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Environmental impacts under different CLSC structures. 
The probability of E I > E j (%) E 
I −E j 
E I 
· 100% (%) 
j = DM When θ j∗ < θ I∗ 51.79 2.80 
When θ j∗ = θ I∗ 13.60 6.80 
j = DR When θ j∗ < θ I∗ 69.16 16.92 
When θ j∗ = θ I∗ 23.88 10.40 
When θ j∗ > θ I∗ 100 54.62 
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c  5.2. Sensitivity with respect to key parameters 
The impact of key modelling parameters on the optimal PIR
level and the proﬁts are also revealed by the numerical analysis.
We observe mostly the expected result that θ ∗ is non-increasing
in c n and k , and non-decreasing in r. For δ the result hinges on the
remanufacturing decision. With δ increasing, the optimal PIR level
may switch from no remanufacturing (and consequently θ ∗ = 0 )
to full remanufacturing with θ ∗ > 0 . Once that happens, a further
increase in δ may reduce the optimal solution, reﬂecting the in-
creased willingness-to-pay and therefore the lower price pressure
on the remanufactured product. Fig. 2 exempliﬁes this result for
Models I and DR. it also shows both the under- and overinvest-
ment issues arising in Model DR. 
Looking at the sensitivity of the proﬁts, as summarised in
Table 3 , we observe that in Model I the expected trends arise.
However, in both decentralised models the only clear-cut tendency
remaining is the manufacturer’s proﬁt falling in c n . All other rela-
tionships can point in either direction. These results highlight the
complexity of the decision situation in the decentralised supply
chain in general. Let us just brieﬂy discuss two speciﬁc aspects.
First, in Model DR the retailer’s proﬁt may be increasing in the in-
vestment cost parameter of PIR, k . When k is small enough, the
manufacturer’s optimal strategy is to invest in PIR and increase
the wholesale price of the new product anticipating that all avail-
able used products will be remanufactured; otherwise, the manu-
facturer’s optimal strategy is to make no investment and price the
new product lower. Consequently, if k is large enough, although
the unit remanufacturing cost is higher, the retailer can obtain a
greater proﬁt due to a lower new product wholesale price. 
Second, in Model DR the retailer’s proﬁt may be decreasing in
the consumer value discount for the remanufactured product, δ.
If δ is small enough, the manufacturer makes no investment in
PIR and the retailer remanufactures nothing; otherwise, the man-
ufacturer always invests in PIR and the retailer remanufactures all
available used products. This result in fact implies that the reman-
ufacturing opportunity may form a lose-lose situation to the man-
ufacturer and the retailer, which has been demonstrated in Xiong,
Zhou, Li, Chan, and Xiong (2013) . The intuition is that, if c n is lownd δ is large enough, as mentioned before, the retailer will re-
anufacture even if there is no PIR. Anticipating that, the manu-
acturer will strategically make an investment and price the new
roduct higher to share the remanufacturing beneﬁt. However, the
igher new product wholesale price will lead to a lower produc-
ion quantity of the new product and undermine the remanufac-
uring beneﬁt. Consequently, both the manufacturer and the re-
ailer may be worse off. 
.3. Environmental impacts 
Let us ﬁnally consider the impacts of PIR on the environment.
ollowing the literature, e.g., Galbreth, Boyacı, and Verter (2013),
an, Xiong, Xiong, and Guo (2015) , and Xiong, Zhao, and Zhou
2016) , we use the overall production quantity E = q n + γ q r as a
roxy for the environmental effect, where γ ≤ 1 reﬂects the po-
entially lower negative impact on the environment due to collect-
ng and reusing end-of-use products. Note that, PIR could be of
elp for the environment because cost savings are usually linked
ith the reduction of carbon emissions and resource consumption
 Porter & Linde, 1995 ). Therefore, in this paper, we assume that
he cost reduction induced by θ has a one-to-one relationship with
he reduction of environmental impacts, i.e., investing θ in reman-
facturing cost reduction, reduces the environmental impact of the
emanufactured product by θ as well, yielding γ = 1 − θ . Table 4
ummarises the aggregate results. The two columns provide the
ollowing information: the ﬁrst column counts the number of sce-
arios in which the weighted production quantity is smaller un-
er decentralisation. For example, from Table 2 we know that there
re 218 scenarios where there is overinvestment in Model DR. The
ssociated entry in the last row of Table 4 tells us that in all of
hose 218 scenarios (i.e., 100%) the weighted production quantity is
maller in Model DR than in Model I. The second column examines
he average change in the weighted production quantity overall. So,
n the ﬁrst line in Table 4 , the value of 2.80% refers to the average
eduction in the weighted production quantity when θ j∗ < θ I∗. 
Because of the well-known effect of double marginalisation, a
ecentralised supply chain always charges a higher price and sells
 smaller quantity than an integrated supply chain. However, from
able 4 we observe that in a closed-loop supply chain, the decen-
ralised decision-making does not always lead to a smaller quan-
ity, e.g., in Model DM when θ j∗ < θ I∗, there is only 51.79% of
cenarios in which the weighted production quantity is reduced.
his result seems counterintuitive at ﬁrst, yet it highlights an im-
ortant structural insight. The mix between new and remanu-
actured products offered may be different; speciﬁcally, the de-
entralised supply chain may offer more new products and less
emanufactured products (due to the underinvestment issue). Thus,
n those scenarios decentralisation forms another loss-loss situa-
ion. Not only do proﬁts decline, but the environmental impact is
lso worsened. 
Second, observe that whenever the manufacturer overinvests
n Model DR, overall environmental impact is always reduced,
.e., when θ j∗ > θ I∗, in 100% of scenarios the weighted production
uantity is reduced; in addition, the average reduction is signiﬁ-
antly higher, i.e., 54.62% in this case, while it is at most 16.92% in
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G  ther cases. Thus, the overinvestment issue, while ineﬃcient from
n economic perspective, beneﬁts the environmental aspect quite
rastically. 
. Conclusions 
Managing closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing is a
ot research topic because of its sustainable proﬁle. In order to ex-
lore its full environmental and economic beneﬁts, this study in-
estigates PIR in a decentralised supply chain. In our model, re-
anufacturing can be conducted by either the manufacturer or the
etailer, and the manufacturer has opportunities to lower the vari-
ble remanufacturing cost via process innovation. 
Our key ﬁndings generate the following implications for differ-
nt stakeholders. 
1) Implications for the manufacturer. In general, traditional pro-
cess innovation for manufacturing accepts small incremental
improvements in that cost savings in the manufacturing pro-
cess, no matter how small they are, can improve the proﬁt mar-
gin; consequently the manufacturer should seize every single
opportunity to lower the new production cost. Conversely, step-
wise innovation is required to signiﬁcantly lower the variable
remanufacturing cost and make remanufacturing viable at all.
That is to say, not all cost-reduction opportunities in the re-
manufacturing process are valuable. The manufacturer should
forgo some opportunities that cannot reduce the variable re-
manufacturing cost beyond the threshold required to make it a
proﬁtable option. 
If investing in PIR is proﬁtable, the manufacturer should care-
ully choose the optimal PIR level, which depends heavily on who
arries out remanufacturing. Intuitively, the global optimal PIR
evel is achieved if the closed-loop supply chain is fully coordi-
ated. Otherwise, the manufacturer should invest less than the
lobal optimal level when remanufacturing is performed by itself
nd might invest over the global optimal level when the retailer
perates the remanufacturing business. 
2) Implications for the retailer. In many industries, especially the
industry of heavy machinery, it is diﬃcult for global manufac-
turers to carry out the remanufacturing operation around the
world, while local retailers beneﬁt from their proximity to cus-
tomers and may perform the remanufacturing task. If remanu-
facturing has no cost advantage, the manufacturer does never
remanufacture; however, the retailer can strategically use re-
manufacturing to compete with the new product and hence in-
duce the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price. That is to
say, retailers could be more proactive to capitalize on remanu-
facturing. 
Given the retailer starts up remanufacturing, the manufacturer
ight invest in PIR even if the global optimal strategy is not to
nvest. As a consequence, the variable remanufacturing cost is re-
uced and then the retailer can beneﬁt more from remanufactur-
ng. 
3) Implications for the government. The remanufacturing sec-
tor is usually supported by the government because of
its sustainable proﬁle. Our study compares manufacturer-
remanufacturing and retailer-remanufacturing and ﬁnds that
retailer-remanufacturing has the following advantages. First, it
is easier to be triggered since the retailer would like to reman-
ufacture even if remanufacturing has no cost eﬃciency; sec-
ond, the manufacturer might invest over the global optimal PIR
level in the case of retailer-remanufacturing; ﬁnally, the over-
investment issue, though ineﬃcient from a supply chain’s prof-
itability point of view, always leads to a reduced virgin mate-rial consumption even without explicit consideration of the en-
vironmental aspects in the decision-making process. Therefore,
the government should give priority to retailer-remanufacturing
when making policies to develop the remanufacturing sector. 
Summarising, our results have shown the potential beneﬁts of
IR, but also the caveats to avoid under decentralised decision-
aking and potentially conﬂicting economic and environmental
ey performance indicators. Future research will have to consider
he relationship between remanufacturing and product innovation
o aid understanding the long-term implications of remanufactur-
ng on new product introductions. A prime example of an asso-
iated open research question concerns the planned obsolescence
ebate, where the environmental beneﬁts of prolonged usage peri-
ds seem to be in conﬂict with the environmental beneﬁts of new
roduct introductions featuring a lower per-unit footprint. 
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